Picture this. You keep dollars at Bank of Maldives. Your child's university fees are due abroad, or a hospital in Colombo or Bangkok needs payment. You ask the bank to send the money, and it takes two weeks. Or you go to an ATM and find you can take out only USD 3,500 for the whole month.
This is what many customers have been living with since September. The bank itself has said why: heavy pressure on its dollar liquidity, and dollar outflows that are "not sustainable". So the problem is already on the record. The question for the public is a different one: who is making sure we are told the truth, and who is making sure it is fixed?
That job belongs to the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA). Every bank has its own reasons for what it says and doesn't say. The regulator exists so that depositors do not have to rely on that. Customers have heard from the bank. The public is still waiting to hear from the regulator.
What anyone can see in the bank's own reports
Think of a bank as a shop that lends out most of its stock. That is normal. But the shop must always keep enough cash at the counter to hand back what customers ask for on any given day.
- Less cash at the counter. A year ago, for every MVR 100 customers deposited, BML kept about MVR 14 in cash and short-term funds. Today it is about MVR 5.
- Lending is growing faster than savings. Loans grew about 30% while deposits grew about 14%. It is like a family that lends more to relatives than it saves, then has to dip into its savings and borrow to pay its own bills. BML's borrowings now stand at about MVR 2.45 billion.
- Customers want more dollars. In the first nine months of this year, BML sold about USD 722 million to customers, and dollar sales were up 31%.
- The dollar "fuel gauge" has disappeared. BML's annual reports showed a dollar liquidity ratio, a gauge of whether a bank could pay out its dollar obligations through 30 days of heavy withdrawals. The last figure was 131%, above the 100% safe line. The latest quarterly report gives one overall figure for all currencies and no dollar gauge.
Without the gauge, outsiders can only estimate. If the share of dollars in deposits at the end of 2025 still holds, BML's dollar cash would be roughly USD 68 million. This is an estimate, not a BML number. Against average dollar sales of about USD 80 million a month, it would be less than one month of stock for something customers are buying faster every month.
Some money BML counted as cash in 2025 was also later moved into longer-term investments, and the comparison figures in the latest report are not all measured the same way. A family cannot tell whether its bank is stronger or weaker than last year when the yardstick keeps changing.
What customers have seen
These are dated public statements, in BML's own words where it spoke.
- 9 September: importers reported dollar transfers taking two to three weeks.
- 12 September: BML said it was under heavy pressure on its foreign currency liquidity, that transfers were delayed, and that online dollar spending was capped at USD 16 million a month.
- 19 September: BML said delays were about two weeks and that the level of dollar outflows was not sustainable.
- 20 September: dollar support was described as subject to availability, and transfers would be cancelled unless the full dollar amount was available.
- 1 October: ATM dollar withdrawals were capped at USD 3,500 a month, down from USD 1,600 a day.
For scale: BML's marketing head said dollar ATM withdrawals reached USD 188 million in July, when its average monthly dollar sales were about USD 81 million. A similar monthly cap was used from April 2020 to February 2023.
"It's the tourist season" is not an answer
Tourist season does bring dollars in. But a farmer who depends on the rains still stores grain, a boat captain still carries spare fuel, and a family still keeps an emergency fund. A bank holds other people's money, so the duty is greater, not smaller. Tourism has already been knocked this year: the conflict disrupted travel, and arrivals have been running about 50,000 behind. Checking that a bank can survive a season that fails is precisely what a regulator is for.
What the regulator can do, and what it has not
The MMA is the referee for banks, and the law gives it real powers. Under the Banking Act it can order directors removed, replace a bank's board with a manager of its own, and cancel a licence.
The gaps were set out in a 2023 review by the IMF and World Bank, published in March 2024. It found that the country had no liquidity rule for banks, and recommended one covering both rufiyaa and dollars. It noted that the MMA had not penalised a bank in the previous decade. It found no system for emergency lending to a bank in need, and it found that BML's foreign currency position was not positive and would worsen if the rufiyaa weakened. Those were warnings written down before the delays began. Whether they have since been acted on is something the public should be told.
What regulators elsewhere did
Other countries acted while there was still something to save:
- India, 2020. When Yes Bank ran short of cash, the central bank capped what each customer could withdraw at Rs 50,000, replaced the board, and arranged for the State Bank of India to step in.
- Bangladesh, 2024. After several banks struggled to pay depositors, the central bank replaced their boards and management.
- Nigeria, 2009. The central bank removed the chief executives of five banks and put in funds after finding liquidity and capital problems.
- Kenya, 2015-16. Three banks, Dubai Bank, Imperial Bank and Chase Bank, were placed under regulatory control after running short of cash.
- Spain, 2012. The government took over Bankia, and its management was replaced.
The lesson is not that any of this is coming here. It is that regulators who acted on the warning signs paid far less than those who waited until customers had lost confidence.
What the international rulebook expects
After the 2008 global crisis, the world's banking rule-setters (the Basel Committee) wrote a standard rule book on liquidity. It tells banks to keep enough ready money to survive a bad month, to check each currency separately because rufiyaa cannot pay a dollar bill, to run "what if" tests, and to watch the warning signs. It also gives supervisors a job: to check that the banks are doing this and to step in early when they are not. And it says never to assume you will be able to borrow or sell your way out in a crisis, because in a crisis everyone is trying the same thing.
The warning signs it lists are now in public view: cash falling, borrowing replacing deposits, delayed payments and withdrawal caps. A smoke alarm is already ringing. You do not wait to see flames before acting. And with no liquidity rule in force, "meets every requirement" is a low bar.
What the MMA should do
The aim is simple: make the facts public, then make the rules clear.
- Tell the public where things stand. Publish the MMA's own assessment of dollar liquidity across the banking system, and say whether it has used any of its supervisory powers.
- Force disclosure. Require every bank to publish its dollar and rufiyaa liquidity ratios each quarter, with a plain definition of what counts as "liquid", plus the average time its dollar transfers take each month.
- Require a stress test. Ask each bank to show what happens to its dollars if the tourist season fails, and publish the results.
- Close the rule gap. Issue a liquidity regulation covering both currencies, with clear, public triggers for stepping in early.
- Build the safety net. Set up an emergency lending framework so that a delay never has to become a failure.
If these things are already being done, the public should hear it. If they are not, they should be.
