This article was written by former Police Commissioner Mohamed Hameed.
Just over a month ago, I wrote about the direction of intelligence within the Maldives Police Service and the wider national security architecture. My concern then was not about internal titles or organisational charts. It was about a more fundamental issue: whether intelligence in the Maldives is being strengthened as a professional, coordinated and legally grounded function, or whether it is being allowed to drift through institutional improvisation.
The reported decision by MPS to rebrand its intelligence function as the “National Intelligence Service” has made that concern more serious.
In my view, this is a wrong and unhelpful move.
This is not because MPS should not have a strong intelligence capability. It absolutely should. A modern police service needs a professional intelligence function to support investigations, crime prevention, public safety, counter-terrorism work, organised crime responses and internal security.
But there is a clear difference between having a strong police intelligence function and calling it a national intelligence service.
That difference matters.
Names matter in security institutions
In ordinary administration, a change of name may not mean much. But in the security sector, names carry weight. They suggest authority, mandate, reach and responsibility.
When a police intelligence function is called the “National Intelligence Service,” it gives the impression that MPS is assuming an apex national intelligence role. It suggests that one law enforcement agency is positioning itself as the central intelligence body of the state.
But the Maldives does not currently have national intelligence legislation that creates such a body, defines its mandate, sets its limits, or explains how it should coordinate with other institutions.
That is the central problem.
A national intelligence service cannot be created by internal police restructuring. It must be established through law, policy, consultation and democratic oversight.
Without that legal foundation, the name itself becomes problematic. It risks creating confusion not only within our own security institutions, but also among external partners who engage with the Maldives on intelligence and security cooperation.
Intelligence is not the work of one institution
In the Maldives, intelligence work has traditionally been carried out by different institutions according to their respective mandates.
MPS has its police intelligence role. MNDF has its defence intelligence role. Customs, Immigration, and other agencies also hold information, capabilities and responsibilities that contribute to the national security picture.
This is normal. In fact, for a small state like ours, this is necessary.
No single institution can see the whole picture on its own. Crime, terrorism, narcotics, cyber threats, foreign influence, border risks, maritime security and public order concerns do not sit neatly inside one agency. They cut across institutional boundaries.
That is why the real need is not for one institution to claim the national space. The real need is for a proper national intelligence coordination framework.
There must be clarity on who collects what, who analyses what, who shares what, who leads on which threat, and how intelligence is elevated to national leadership. There must also be rules to prevent duplication, rivalry and misuse.
Without such rules, rebranding one agency’s intelligence function as “national” risks weakening the harmony of the security architecture.
It does not serve MPS well either
From the MPS perspective, this name may have been intended to give its intelligence function wider reach, more credibility and better engagement space.
But in intelligence, credibility does not come from a grand title. It comes from professionalism.
It comes from accurate analysis, lawful collection, disciplined reporting, proper source evaluation, institutional trust and accountable oversight. It comes from the quality of the work, not the size of the name.
A police intelligence function can be nationally relevant without being called the National Intelligence Service. In fact, it would serve MPS better to strengthen its intelligence function within the police mandate, rather than adopt a name that invites unnecessary criticism and possible friction with other institutions.
MPS should be focused on building an intelligence function that is respected for its discipline, quality and contribution to public safety. It does not need a name that suggests it is taking over the national intelligence space.
The risk is institutional disharmony
Security institutions in the Maldives already operate in a small and sensitive environment. The mandates of law enforcement, defence, border security and counter-terrorism often overlap. This makes coordination even more important.
When one institution adopts a name that appears to extend beyond its legal mandate, it can create discomfort among others. It can lead to questions about authority, access, reporting lines and ownership of intelligence.
That is not healthy.
The Maldives does not need intelligence agencies competing for national status. It needs all relevant institutions contributing to a shared national security picture.
A national intelligence arrangement should bring institutions together. It should not allow one institution to symbolically place itself above the others.
Consultation should have come first
A change of this nature should not be made quietly or administratively.
It should have been discussed with the Ministry of Defence, MNDF, NCTC, Customs, Immigration, the Attorney General’s Office, the President’s Office and relevant parliamentary oversight bodies.
The question is not whether MPS can restructure itself. Of course it can.
The real question is whether MPS should adopt a name that implies a national intelligence mandate when no law gives it that role.
That is not a small administrative matter. It is a national security governance issue.
Such decisions must be widely consulted, carefully debated and legally grounded.
The way forward
The Maldives does need a stronger national intelligence arrangement. But it must be built properly.
We need a legal framework that defines the national intelligence architecture of the country. It should clearly set out the roles of MPS, MNDF and other agencies. It should create a coordination mechanism for national threat assessments, intelligence sharing, inter-agency tasking and escalation to national leadership.
It should also ensure safeguards against political misuse and institutional overreach.
Until that happens, MPS should strengthen its intelligence function within its policing and internal security mandate. The name it had until yesterday served it well, was more accurate and institutionally responsible.
The work of intelligence is too sensitive to be handled through symbolism. The country needs law, structure, coordination and trust.
In intelligence, credibility is not created by a nameplate. It is earned through professionalism, restraint, legal clarity and the confidence of other institutions.
That is why this move is wrong. Not because MPS’ intelligence is unimportant.
But because national intelligence must belong to a national system, not to one institution’s rebranding exercise.
